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In the years since the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Brown v. Board of Education (1954) , most discussions of the case have focused on whether it was effective in promoting lasting equality of opportunity in the public schools. Although this profoundly important question dominates retrospectives on Brown, another unresolved controversy relates to whether the ruling has altered in any fundamental way the role of social science evidence in constitutional litigation. More than 50 years later, substantial disagreement persists about whether this kind of research has played or should play any important role in the jurisprudence of race. Today, social scientists face increasing doubts about their neutrality and objectivity, struggle to be heard in a marketplace of ideas increasingly flooded with information of questionable quality, and encounter growing resistance to the notion that expertise provides a proper foundation for legal decisionmaking. For those who still believe that social science has a role to play in advancing racial justice, the strategy used in Brown can no longer be taken for granted. The time is ripe to reassess what counts as knowledge so that social science is not increasingly marginalized in courts of law.
JL n the years since the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Brown v. Board of Education (1954) , most discussions of the case have focused on whether it was effective in promoting lasting equality of opportunity in the public schools. Although this profoundly important question dominates retrospectives on Brown, another unresolved controversy relates to whether the ruling has altered in any fundamental way the role of social science evidence in constitutional litigation. There is no doubt that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense Fund (NAACP LDF) and that advocates hope decision's legacy. The Co by citing social science e attracted both high prais More than 50 years lat about whether this kind important role in the ju face increasing doubts abo gle to be heard in a mar information of question tance The LDF assembled a team of historians, including Alfred Kelly, who was chair of the history department at Wayne University in Detroit. Kelly was determined not to allow history to be prostituted, even in the service of a cause as noble as the NAACP's quest for racial justice (Kluger 1977:626) . Yet during intense preparation of the briefs, he recalled that "I ceased to function as an historian and instead took up the practice of law without a license. The problem we faced was not the historian's discovery of the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; the problem instead was the formulation of an adequate gloss . . . sufficient to convince the Court that we had something of an historical case. ... " (Kluger 1977:640) . Kelly considered it almost fortuitous that he eventually emerged with an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's history that was both accurate and supportive of the NAACP's agenda (Kluger 1977:641) .
When the Court struck down state-mandated segregation and cited the LDF's social science evidence in footnote 1 1 of the Brown opinion, some believed that the case would usher in a new partnership between law and social science. In a 1956 article, Jack Greenberg, an LDF attorney, concluded that "the school segregation cases suggest an entirely different way in which the testimony of social scientists can be made useful to the courts" (Greenberg 1956:962) . Instead of deploying experts merely to establish relevant facts, research could influence normative judgments as " [a] variety of information is brought to bear along with the court's concepts of justice and welfare" (Greenberg 1956:962) . In defending the use of social science to adjudicate more than narrow factual disputes, Greenberg rejected any bright-line distinction between facts and norms. Arguing that "moral judgments are generated by awareness of facts," he concluded that "constitutional interpretation should consider all relevant knowledge" (Greenberg 1956:969) .
Greenberg predicted that reliance on social science would grow as courts confronted more lawsuits that implicated public law issues. His faith in this evidence was not naïve, however. Because of the "emotional and controversial areas of life" at issue, he recognized that "it may be difficult for the court, and for the social scientists, to separate uncertain controversy from positive fact finding" (Greenberg 1956:967) . As a result, Greenberg anticipated some judicial distrust of expert testimony, but he was confident that these doubts would dissipate as jurists gradually acquainted themselves with the assumptions and methodologies underlying the research.
Greenberg mostly was preoccupied with how social science could benefit the legal process, but he also saw advantages for social scientists, who would be "afford [ed] . . . the satisfaction of close participation in the operation of society and the administration of justice" (Greenberg 1956:970 ing conventional forms of authority. In that sense, e deployed in the service of law and not vice versa. As a
The field that was constructed tilted in favor of law. It may h possible in the 1950s to imagine that sociology or anoth science would be able to gain ascendancy over law in provid expertise and experts in state governance, but by the late 1 was clear that law had reformed -incorporated enough soci ence to regain its status and relevancy (Garth & Sterling 19 By the 1980s, "those who continued to insist too s the importance of social science methods once ag themselves on the mar 1998:465 vision of an activist State that had spawned it. As the tenets of a interventionist government came under attack, the middle lost it footing. This declining influence prompted some scholars to argu that "the time is ripe for a post-law and economics' initiative" th would "renew [the Law & Society Association's] progressive role at th intersection of law and social science" (Garth & Sterling 1998:466) . During this time, Law and Society researchers faced challenge from the left as well as the right. The Critical Legal Studies move ment questioned the notion that law should be the object of socia science inquiry, the dependent variable, rather than an autonomous field with an independent and powerful influence of its ow (Tomlins 2000:960) . The Crits, as they were called, pointedly re jected social scientists' claims to objectivity and neutrality, equating their methodology with a positivism that did little more than re inforce the status quo (Tomlins 2000:961) . Nor were the Crits alon in questioning Law and Society's foundational assumptions. Schol ars engaged in feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory, fo instance, also doubted that law should be understood as a "universal, abstract, objective, and neutral construct created by partic ular actors" (Menkel-Meadow 1990:107 Law professor Michael Heise has argued that "one of Brow critical -though underappreciated -indirect effects [is that transforming educational opportunity doctrine by casting it e pirically" (Heise 2005:280) . In his view, the decision contributed "law's increasingly multidisciplinary character," a change t greatly expands what counts as knowledge in the courtroo (Heise 2005:280) . According to Heise, this new role for social s ence evidence is perhaps Brown's most lasting contribution, a l innovation on a par with its iconic status, regardless of whether t case achieved lasting gains in school desegregation. Yet even He concedes that Brown's multidisciplinary legacy has yielded mix results. In his view, the decision "narrowed the doctrine, dilut the influence of broader notions of justice, and risked privileg social science evidence over background constitutional valu (Heise 2002 (Heise :1311 . Moreover, courts and judges were thrust in "relatively unfamiliar intellectual terrain" that revealed their l itations in dealing with expert evidence (Heise 2002 (Heise :1312 was a turning point an more hostile to social science evidence since Brown" (Fradella 2003:114) .
Other critics go even further than Fradella, contending that there never was a golden age of law and social science after Brown, which in turn collapsed with the McCleskey decision. Chief Justice Earl Warren himself once remarked that footnote 1 1 "was only a note, after all" (Kluger 1977:706) . Some legal scholars have taken Chief Justice Warren at his word, concluding that the evidence in Brown was mere window dressing, a way to justify a decision that the justices would have reached in any event. According to this view, Brown merely perpetuated disingenuousness where research is concerned. Judges today -as in the past -make limited use of this evidence, primarily as a convenient post hoc justification for the results they desire (Mody 2002; Ryan 2003) .
The contested relationship between law and social science in turn implicates claims that Brown transformed the litigation process, opening it up to a wide range of evidence. According to law professor Abram Chayes, the decision ushered in a "public law litigation" model (Chayes 1976 (Chayes :1284 . Earlier lawsuits had focused on intention and fault as the touchstones for ordering private disputes, but Broum effected a transformation that rendered these traditional concepts "mere metaphors" for a broader concern with justice. Judges shifted their attention to collective harms that required prospective relief, and reform-oriented lawsuits assumed an open-ended quality that took on some features of a legislative hearing. Multiple interests were represented, as the courts certified class actions and allowed a range of intervenors to participate. Social science evidence, introduced through direct testimony or amicus (Chayes Chayes's process role in Judge J law and social science as a "love match" (Wisdom 1975:142) .
Despite this cozy image of a perfect pairing, scholars of education law have remained dubious about the contributions that social scientists made. As Ryan observes, "Brown was the first and onl desegregation decision by the Supreme Court that at least ap peared to rest on social science evidence regarding the harm that segregated schools inflicted on black students" (Ryan 2003 (Ryan :1665 Afterward, this type of proof was deemed unnecessary because the Court refused to "allow the Tactual' questions decided in Brown to be reopened" (Hashimoto 1997:140-2; Yudof 1978:7o) .1
As a result, the partnership that developed between law and social science in de jure school segregation cases largely revolved around the implementation of remedial orders. Here, social scientists arguably played a key role in persuading courts to pursue compre hensive, structural reform and giving them a justification for their mandates. As one judge recalls, "The social science evidence did exactly what I expected it to do. What it did was to educate the parties from the very simplistic approach that both sides had taken in the first hearing" (Chesler et al. 1988:217) . The love affair betwee law and social science began to fade, however, in the mid-1960s when the Coleman report reshaped the academic debate about the benefits of integration and the harms of segregation (Coleman et al. 1966 ). The report had been commissioned by the U.S. Office of Education, which anticipated that the results would provide hard evidence of racial isolation's pernicious effects. Instead, the research team offered mixed findings. Black students performed better academically in integrated schools than in segregated ones. But thes differences perhaps had more to do with family background and peer influences than with the school itself. Moreover, the gains could be due to socioeconomic rather than racial integration (Chesler et al. 
1988:41-2).
This study "broke the nearly united front that social science had presented on school desegregation" (Chesler et al. 1988:43) . Nonetheless, school boards had difficulty in obtaining expert tes timony. When social scientists participated on behalf of a schoo district, they felt stymied by evidentiary presumptions about th ongoing harms of de jure segregation, presumptions that left few ways to influence the case (Ryan 2003 (Ryan :1666 . As one expert witness explained, "The legal doctrine is cast in concrete, and that's been one of my frustrations. It's as though the evidence is really immaterial." He went on to recall how he was admonished by the court for "questioning the facts oí Brown11 (Chesler et al. 1988:43) . Eventually, however, school boards became increasingly sophisticated in the use of social science evidence. The growing battle of the experts took its toll, as judges faced a bewildering array of conflicting studies and claims, which at times "forced [a court] back to its own common sense approach" (Hobson v. Hansen 1971:859) .
This "common sense" approach gradually reinstated a private model of the law governed by relatively manageable concepts like intent and fault, rather than by inquiries into complex, cumulative harms. As education scholar Mark Yudof observed as early as 1978, "Since Brown, my impression is that, with few notable exceptions, there has been a marked decline in the willingness of the Supreme Court to embrace social science evidence as the basis for constitutional decisions." Instead, he argued, the Court limited itself to occasional references to studies bearing on "factual matters" (Yudof 1978:70) . Yudof attributed this chilly reception to "a crisis of legitimacy" regarding the objectivity and relevance of research, particularly after "the [perceived] failures of social science-based policy strategies during the War on Poverty of the 1960s" (Yudof 1978:71) .
The most notable example of the Court's reluctance was its response to the LDF's efforts to declare de facto segregation unconstitutional. De facto segregation arises from housing patterns and other factors not directly attributable to past wrongdoing by school officials. Brown had outlawed only segregation due to official acts of discrimination, but the studies in the Court's famous footnote implied that racial isolation had harmful effects, regardless of its cause. Determined to challenge de facto segregation in the North and West, the LDF launched a litigation campaign that once again turned to social scientists. This time, sociologist Karl Taeuber developed studies on residential segregation, showing that a range of government agencies had acted with segregative intent and that a neighborhood school policy perpetuated the resulting patterns of racial separation (Chesler et al. 1988:50-1) . This testimony was designed "to advance a public law view of responsibility and therefore of the issues appropriately in dispute" (Chesler et al. 1988: 51-2). Despite Taeuber's evidence, the Court rejected the LDF's claim that de facto segregation was unconstitutional (Milliken v. Bradley 1974) . Instead, the justices adopted a standard that "was obviously quite formal and blind to the demographic realities of most metropolitan areas" (Ryan 2003 (Ryan :1667 of systematic research findings. Powell believed that college and university administrators could properly promote diversity as a way to expose students to a wide range of backgrounds and perspectives and thus promote the free exchange of ideas. Evidence for this approach was decidedly thin, so Powell instead was forced to rely on broad allusions to tradition and experience (Heise 2008:876-7) .2 According to Justice Powell's biographer, John
Jeffries, the diversity rationale was not the product of pedagogical expertise but a plausible justification for the results that Justice
Powell instinctively wanted. Justice Powell thought that the law should permit race to be considered but that there should not be "carte blanche for racial preferences" and the programs should be temporary (Jeffries 1994:469) . Thirty years later, the Court again confronted the constitutionality of affirmative action in university admissions in Grutier v. Bollinger (2003) . With the programs in operation for decades, one might have expected social science studies on the pedagogical and social impact to be well-developed and influential. In fact, in responding to charges of reverse discrimination, the University of Michigan had to generate a great deal of expert testimony on the benefits of a diverse student body. Even so, it is unclear what impact, if any, this evidence had. For one thing, the research was hotly contested. A professor of psychology at Michigan, Dr. Patricia Gurin, found positive correlations between diversity in the classroom and interracial socializing on the one hand and intellectual engagement and active learning, particularly for white students, on the other (Moran 2008:464) . Because these findings were directly relevant to Justice Powell's rationale, the survey research came under vigorous attack from experts on the other side. Critics assailed Gurin's methodology and questioned the relevance of mere correlations, when the law required proof of a causal relationship between admissions practices and improved pedagogical outcomes (Moran 2008:465-6 ).
Faced with a battle of the experts, the trial court concluded that Michigan's researchers had demonstrated that diversity could yield educational benefits, but this proved something of a Pyrrhic 2 Law professor Ian Haney López contends that Justice Powell was influenced by sociologist Nathan Glazer's work because the Bakke opinion relies on the imagery of "a nation of minorities." Haney López concedes, however, that Justice Powell never cited to Glazer, although amicus briefs did refer to his book on affirmative discrimination, which in turn could have influenced Justice Powell or one of his clerks (Haney López 2007 :1043 Ironically, research methodologies designed to document the benefits of diversity were shunted aside as "theoretical," while anecdotal evidence became the basis for a grounded description of reality. No one cited the methodological limitations of these firstperson accounts; on the contrary, the Court revealed its preference for what it has termed the "pages of human experience" (Parham v.
J. R. 1979:602; see also Bersoff & Glass 1995; Hashimoto 1997 ).
The uncertain place of social science in cases on race and education was brought home in the Court's recent decision in School boards in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky, defended their voluntary integration plans by arguing that the diversity rationale applies to elementary and secondary education. opinion made plain, the alliance between law and social science has been badly fractured, and there is no clear consensus about the relevance of research in resolving legal questions. Brown's multidisciplinary legacy can no longer be taken for granted (Frankenberg & Garces 2008:746) .
Social Science Enters the Courtroom: Does This Evidence
Generally Count As Knowledge?
The gap between Browns multidisciplinary aspirations and today's jurisprudential realities derives at least in part from inherent tensions between the epistemologies of law and social science, tensions that were not fully addressed in the flush of a landmark school desegregation victory. As Susan Haack, a professor of law and philosophy, explains:
The culture of the law is adversarial, and its goal is case-specific, final answers. The culture of the sciences, by contrast, is investigative, speculative, generalizing, and thoroughly fallibilist: most scientific conjectures are sooner or later discarded, even the bestwarranted claims are subject to revision if new evidence demands it, and progress is ragged and uneven. . . . It's no wonder that the legal system often asks more of science than science can give, and often gets less from science than science could give; nor that strong scientific evidence sometimes falls on deaf legal ears, while flimsy scientific ideas sometimes become legally entrenched (Haack 2003:57) .
Haack contends that the divergence of law from science calls into question the very legitimacy of the adversarial process as a truthfinding device -at least when "key factual questions can be answered only with the help of scientific work beyond the comprehension of anyone not trained in the relevant discipline" (Haack 2003:63) .
The clash of epistemologies that Haack describes has grown even more fraught due to an information explosion that makes quality control urgent yet extremely difficult to achieve. According to law professor Elizabeth Warren, because research can play a strategic role in calls for reform, markets for data hav distort the neutrality and objectivity of expertise. T especially pressing when the flow of information is un example, in the political process. As she writes,
In the rough and tumble world of legislative policy-ma campaigns to shape public opinions, there is ... no con junk science, no datum too filthy or too bizarre to be bar the decision-making process. Instead, when legislative making is at stake, the free market of the economists dreams exists: an unrestricted and rough world of co ideas, information, and misinformation that parties will e based on quality signals -and their own idiosyncra (Warren 2002:6) .
Warren worries that assurances of quality, particularly ated with an academic reputation for independence a have been seriously degraded. Increasingly, scholars m side funding to support their work. As government gr there is increasing pressure to undertake research for h ing to Warren, "For anyone who does independ research, who has little to trade in but her independ utation, the idea that the market for data has devalued signal for independence and quality -university af deeply discouraging" (Warren 2002:30) .
Though Warren focuses primarily on the troubled between law and social science in the legislative realm not been exempt from these perils. Judges have w whether "hired guns" distort the pursuit of the adversarial process. Justice David Souter sparked a controversy when he announced in Exxon Shipping (2008) that the Court "decline[d] to rely" on resea counter to anecdotal reports on the unpredictabilit damage awards. Justice Souter dismissed the studies had been funded by Exxon, which sought to limit its li major oil spill in Alaska (Liptak 2008) . Justice Souter were especially hard-hitting because some of the rejecte prepared by prominent scholars and published in pr journals.3 Though directed at Exxon's efforts to ma academic debate, Justice Souter's skepticism clearly tions for the credibility of social science evidence m (Liptak 2008; Weinstein 1994 Confronted with an onslaught of information, the Court has struggled to regulate access to the adversarial process in a meaningful way. In the early 1990s, the justices revisited the standards for This new approach empowered courts to second-guess the experts' conventional wisdom, given increasing doubts about the integrity of the partisan evidence being introduced (Chesebro 1993; Huber 1991) . Daubert, however, created problems of its own. For one thing, it was not clear that judges were competent to make independent assessments of scientific reliability (Mnookin 2008 (Mnookin :1019 . For another, a significant body of evidence did not conform to Daubert's model of scientific inquiry, which was based on traditions in the natural and physical sciences (Brodin Moran 533 2005:869-70, 876-7). As a result, trial courts had expert testimony as "other specialized knowledge, muddied the standards for admissibility (Renake 1673-84). Most of the controversy surrounding Daubert h way in which it targeted adjudicative facts, specific that arise in applying a doctrinal principle. The st reach legislative facts, which inform courts in m judgments about relevant policy concerns (Anc Hashimoto 1997:111-13, 126-7) . So, for example, i data on the equalization of teachers and facilities schools related to adjudicative facts. The finding whether conditions in each school district satisfie but equal" doctrine (Hashimoto 1997:118) . Today, tive action lawsuit, data on the weight given to ra sions process also would be an adjudicative fac evaluate whether race is so influential that it impermissible quota rather than a constitutionally (Ancheta 2008:112, n. 22) . Expert testimony on a like these is carefully scrutinized for reliability und Brown's brave new vision, however, was focused on social science's role in effecting transformation in the law, not merely in resolving narrow factual questions under existing doctrine. So, in Brown, research on the inescapable harms of segregation, even in dual school systems that had equalized, was a legislative fact. It bore on the normative question at the heart of the Court's constitutional dilemma: Could separate ever be equal (Hashimoto 1997:118 studies on the benefits of diversity in elementary and secondary schools played an analogous role. This research was deployed to support a normative commitment to color consciousness, not just as a remedy for past discrimination but as a bridge to a multiracial future (Ancheta 2008 (Ancheta :1143 Mickelson 2008 Mickelson :1178 ).
Daubert does not reach evidence on legislative facts, which judges are free to admit at their discretion. For that reason the Court has been able to adopt a liberal, open-door policy on amicus briefs. Though a formal rule mandates that briefs be submitted only when they provide new factual or legal information, in practice the Court grants nearly every application to file (Garcia 2008:321; Harrington 2005:675; Kearney & Merrill 2000:761-6 ). This open-door policy is important to Brown's multidisciplinary legacy because amicus briefs can address legislative facts that counsel may not address due to procedural and evidentiary constraints (Roesch et al. 1991; Simard 2008:674-5 ). Yet merely submitting evidence is not the same as wielding influence, particularly when there are few safeguards to assure reliability and relevance. as basic legal analysis becomes "investigative, speculative, generalizing, and thoroughly fallibilist," and like most scientific conjectures, "even the best-warranted claims are subject to revision if new evidence demands it, and progress is ragged and uneven" (Haack 2003:57) .
With this flexibility and openness, a responsive model of the law can be generous -even bold -in using social science evidence to reconsider fundamental normative commitments, much as the Brown Court was. Social pressures then become "sources of knowledge and opportunities for self-correction" (Haack 2003:77) . This approach is not without risk, however. As courts become increasingly receptive to alternative sources of knowledge, the adjudicative process loses its claim to a unique authority. This loss of authoritativeness in turn jeopardizes integrity, although Nonet and Selznick ultimately conclude that the gains justify the costs. In particular, other forms of knowledge, including social science, enable courts to distill the meaning of the public good in ways that transcend a purely selfinterested use of political power (Nonet & Selznick 2001) . Today, the Supreme Court is awash in information, a phenomenon that might appear to vindicate responsive law's possibilities (Zick 2003:120, 195-6 ). Yet as already noted, bombarding the justices with briefs does not necessarily mean that social science becomes a source of knowledge for self-correction. Writing about the Rehnquist Court, Zick contends that constitutional empiricism often has served as a smokescreen to reinstate a formalistic approach to the law (Zick 2003:221) . In his view, the Rehnquist Court was able to manipulate research because there were no clear benchmarks for interpreting the findings. Without a "way to distinguish 'good' and 'bad' empirical results," he asserts, "courts [were] not using data to falsify their own notions of what the law should be, but to support their claims of what the law is. ... " (Zick 2003:211) . Contrary to appearances, the Rehnquist Court's epistemological universe did not expand, and the divide between law and social science evidence remained wide.
According to Zick, research remained subordinated to legal verities, always confirming rather than testing them.
Under Chief Justice William Rehnquist's successor, Chief Justice Roberts, the Court now includes a plurality of justices who embrace formalism. They do not indulge in any pretense of constitutional empiricism and so largely exclude social science evidence as a way of knowing. Chief Justice Roberts and his colleagues, Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito share a belief that law is abstract and universal; it can be discerned from legal texts and, for some of the justices, from legal history (Rossum 2006:27-44; Scalia 1989 Scalia :1184 1997:16-18, 23-5, 29-37 (Gilmore 1977:63) .
Because legal interpretation does not require attention to context or changing conditions, formalism maximizes the tensions between law and science as ways of knowing. A formalist approach requires courts to look to their judicial predecessors, not contemporary social scientists, to determine what the law should look like.
Haack's dichotomy reemerges with a vengeance: Law is immutable; science is tentative; law is certain; science is speculative. At most, then, social science can speak to adjudicative facts, but it cannot offer up legislative facts that serve as the motive force in a public law litigation model. For instance, in the challenge to affirmative action at the University of Michigan, the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies would depend entirely on the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and perhaps its history, but certainly not on social science research on the benefits of diversity that Michigan had amassed. Given Brown's precepts, the decision has been something of a thorn in the formalists' side. After all, the reasoning in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, including footnote 1 1 , bears little resemblance to the closed epistemological universe that Chief Justice Roberts and his colleagues envision. In a recent debate over constitutional philosophy, Justice Breyer asked how Brown's result could be squared with Justice Scalia's commitment to strict reliance on constitutional text. Justice Scalia did not answer the question, but he has called the tactic "waving the bloody shirt oí Brown" (Liptak 2009:14) . In truth, dramatic changes in American race relations, catalyzed in part by the Court's constitutional leadership, pose a seemingly insurmountable challenge to the static system of jurisprudence that formalists endorse.
Perhaps reacting prudentially to the "bloody shirt," other members of the Court have declined to adopt a formalist philosophy. In Grutter, for example, Justice O'Connor penned the majority opinion, which clearly rejected a textualist claim that the Constitution is color-blind based on race-neutral language that "no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" (U.S. Const., am. 14). Instead, her decision rested on the diversity rationale without reaching more profound questions of social justice. According to law professor Cass Sunstein, Justice O'Connor was practicing the virtues of "judicial minimalism" (Sunstein 1999:9) . Minimalism, as Sunstein defines it, is a far cry from responsive law. A minimalist judge strives, to the extent possible, to reserve legislating for legislators. Courts therefore dispose of cases on grounds that "leave open the most fundamental and difficult constitutional questions" (Sunstein 1996:7) . In doing so, judges allow the democratic process to resolve complex questions that provoke deep and divided views among the citizenry. In the area of affirmative action, for example, a minimalist adopts neither a strictly color-blind approach that bans race-conscious admissions policies, nor a theory of justice that would legitimate quotas and set-asides. As Sunstein says, members of the Court who adhere to minimalism have "endorsed no rule and no theory" in this hotly contested area (Sunstein 1999:135) . Their stance "has, however, attempted to help trigger public debate, with, perhaps, an understanding on the part of some of the justices that until recently, the debate was neither broadly inclusive nor properly deliberative -and that it did not honestly reflect people's underlying concerns" (Sunstein 1999:135) . Because this jurisprudential strategy has been democracy-promoting and keeps the discussion of affirmative action alive, Sunstein concludes that it is "possible to celebrate what many have seen as the Court's indefensible course of rule-free judgment" (Sunstein 1999:136) .
Race presents some unique problems for Sunstein's celebratory account of minimalism, particularly insofar as Brown itself "appears to be the strongest example against the claim that [Sunstein means] to defend" (Sunstein 1999:37) . In an attempt to reclaim the jurisprudential high ground, Sunstein argues that Brown "was far less maximalist than it might seem; it can even be taken as a form of democracy-promoting minimalism" (Sunstein 1999:38-9) . To justify this rather improbable statement, he relies on the fact that the landmark decision was the culmination of a litigation campaign that involved incremental victories. Moreover, in Brown II (Brown v. Board of Education 1955), when the Court addressed implementation of its pathbreaking school desegregation decision, the justices relied on a gradualist approach. The decision to integrate "with all deliberate If anything, Sunstein's account suggests the limits of responsive law, the political perils that come with judicial engagement in broad social controversies. These dangers in turn explain the Court's gradual retreat from the bold innovations of the Warren Court. Through the judicial appointments process, Congress has steadily populated the Court with justices who -at least during the nomination hearings -expressly disavow any desire to make rather than apply the law. Confirmation proceedings have served as a vehicle to discredit responsive law by treating it as the province of wayward judicial activists (Eisgruber 2007; Epstein & Segal 2005) . Law professor Stephen Carter attributes the shift directly to the Supreme Court's stand on school desegregation:
Brown changed everything. Infuriated by the Supreme Court's temerity in striking down public school segregation, the Southern Democrats who in those days still largely ran the Senate began to require that all potential justices give testimony before the Judiciary Committee. When the nominees appeared, the Dixiecrat Senators grilled them on Brown. The first was John Marshall Harlan in 1955, who declined invitations to discuss either specific cases or judicial philosophy as a matter of "propriety." One by one, later nominees followed his example (Carter 2009:9). According to Carter, today's hearings "follow the same model that they did half a century ago when the Dixiecrats invented them" (Carter 2009:9 ). This screening process, then as now, is designed to limit the prospects for responsive law, including its openness to social science evidence as a source of normative guidance.
Moving Forward: Can the Dialogue Over What Counts As Knowledge Be Transformed?
The Law and Society movement faces several challenges in ensuring that Brown's legacy with regard to law and social science evidence remains robust an explosion of inform critical problem is how t tic, the significant and productive. This is a ta evidence as to other forms of information. Social scientists have an obvious edge, of course, insofar as their disciplines already impose standards to ensure accuracy and rigor. But the turn in Brown was multidisciplinary, and the very breadth of methodological approaches can create problems as scholars try to position themselves as guardians of quality.
Consider, for example, the Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) movement's efforts to safeguard the integrity and credibility of research. Law professor Elizabeth Chambliss describes ELS as an attempt to create "an 'empirical' brand" committed to "quantitative, statistical, and experimental methods" (Chambliss 2008:31) . In fact, the movement's slogan is "Bringing Methods to Our Madness" (Chambliss 2008:32) . To that end, ELS calls for disclosure of methods and seems to prefer those that produce measurable results that can be replicated (G. Mitchell 2004:197-204) . According to Chambliss, ELS's methodological commitments have allied it with positivist social science, research that investigates questions posed by legal doctrine without necessarily interrogating underlying normative assumptions. These are the problems of the "middle range" that Merton described, except that the objects of legal study are now "corporate law, political theory, research methodology, and courts" (Chambliss 2008:33) . Work in the middle range turns on a sense that legal frameworks are stable and solid. In fact, the rise of ELS in the corporate field may be a tribute to the success of law and economics in securing doctrinal precepts that now enjoy widespread acceptance. Moreover, research on business-related matters positions ELS to participate in the high-powered markets for data that Elizabeth Warren has described as seriously in need of quality control. This need grows even more urgent as business and corporate disputes occupy an increasing proportion of the Supreme Court's otherwise shrinking docket (Lazarus 2008 ).
So far, Chambliss asserts, ELS has spent relatively little time on issues related to race (Chambliss 2008:33) . The Court's fractured jurisprudence in this area probably seems like particularly treacherous terrain for positivist social science. Split decisions, with majorities and dissents sometimes openly sniping at one another, make normative uncertainty palpable and legal standards patently insecure. These battles in turn can frustrate efforts to focus narrowly on the middle range. Shifting paradigms of law can eclipse even high-quality social science. For instance, in the McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) case, death penalty opponents developed statistical evidence on inequitable sentencing patterns based Although the analysis was deemed reliable, the Court efforts to bring it to bear on the constitutionality of ishment. Instead, the work was marginalized by a jur philosophy that privileged discriminatory intent and data on disparate impact.
Even in areas of race and the law that would seem to invite quantitative evidence of the type that ELS prizes, doctrinal uncertainties can have a chilling effect. Consider, for instance, developments under the Voting Rights Act. First-generation enforcement efforts targeted denials of the franchise through literacy tests and other practices that interfered with individual registration and voting. Once these problems were addressed, second-generation litigation emphasized fairness in aggregating votes so that minorities would enjoy not only formal access but also meaningful representation. To address problems of aggregation, courts required data on racial polarization in the voting process. This information was critical to understanding how choices about the boundaries of electoral districts helped or hindered minority representation (Guinier 1991 (Guinier :1093 .
Under this framework, researchers should have been central to voting rights litigation. As legal scholar Richard H. Pildes observes, "Law and social science are perhaps nowhere more mutually dependent than in the voting-rights field" because "the critical elements of the cause of action that the Voting Rights Act . . . creates are defined in terms of legal concepts that necessarily must be given content through the kind of data that social-scientific analysis makes available" (Pildes 2002 (Pildes :1518 . Even here, however, doctrinal flux has plagued the alliance between law and social science. The difficulties are evident in the Court's recent decision in Bartlett v. Strickland (2009) . There, the justices heard a challenge to a North Carolina redistricting plan that eliminated a district with a majority of minority voters and substituted several districts with substantial pluralities of these voters. By establishing a safe district that guaranteed minority representation, the original plan enhanced minority political power, but it also reduced the possibility for coalitional politics that allowed minority voters to wield influence by building cross-racial alliances.
If, as studies have shown, white voters are increasingly willing to support nonwhite candidates, coalitional districts actually could enhance minority representation (Pildes 2002 (Pildes :1518 (Pildes , 1529 (Pildes , 1567 .
With consistent evidence that crossover voting has been a robust phenomenon, advocates urged the Court to permit coalitional districts to supplant safe ones, so long as the shift enhanced overall minority influence (Bartlett v. Strickland 2009 :1243 Pildes 2002 Pildes :1534 Pildes , 1539 . The justices rejected this plea, and in doing so, they sent a cautionary message about the role of social science Act, the tensions between law and science that Haack (2003) describes were evident.
For ELS, this kind of jurisprudential ambiguity, so typical of race cases, disrupts the underlying model of how social science relates to law. Law provides doctrinal principles, which in turn raise factual questions that social scientists can usefully answer.
Cases like McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) and Bartlett v. Strickland (2009) are a sobering reminder that research, even of high quality, can be dismissed as irrelevant in cases characterized by deep conflicts over constitutional values. Because this kind of marginalization hardly boosts ELS's authority and credibility, the Court's fractured decisions on race are something of a red flag. ELS therefore appears unlikely to resurrect Brown's promise broadly understood, even if data-driven research becomes prominent in addressing problems of the middle range in relatively well-settled areas of law.
The New Legal Realism (NLR) movement has adopted a very different approach to reclaiming the partnership between law and social science. Like the Law and Society movement, NLR aspires to include a range of methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative (T. Mitchell & Mertz 2006:4) . This openness to various methods is important to Brown's vision because diverse types of research can reveal new ways of framing social controversies and constitutional disputes. Consistent with an emphasis on lived experience, NLR encourages bottom-up inquiries that explore how law affects people's day-to-day existence. This research in turn can supplement large-scale surveys that support broad generalizations but may obscure the nuances of individual difference (Erlanger et al. 2005) .
NLR is explicitly concerned with power and hierarchy in the study of law. Adherents acknowledge the politics of knowledge, calling into doubt whether any social science study can be truly neutral and objective (Erlanger et al. 2005:339-43) . In this, NLR appears to be somewhat at odds with ELS, which emphasizes neutrality and objectivity as hallmarks of quality and trustworthiness. NLR is also relatively forthcoming about its reformist aspirations. Yet the commodious intellectual tenets and reformist ambitions of NLR raise the specter of marginalization. For social science inquiries to do more than reinforce the status quo, Law and Society scholar Stewart Macaulay says, scholars must be willing to ask hard questions and adopt unorthodox approaches when interpreting their findings. In his view, "the hard part is to get such research funded or to have it count toward tenure in universities that are more and more pushed to please the powerful as the schools struggle for funds" (Macaulay 2005:395) . In the market for data, there may be few eager consumers of work that upends prevailing conventions, particularly in ways that empower the disadvantaged. Even if researchers succeed in conducting these studies, Macaulay points out, "people are well armed with defenses to ward off offensive or inconvenient knowledge" (Macaulay 2005:396) .
Barriers to unconventional inquiry can be especially troublesome in the area of race, particularly if this research regularly leads to uncomfortable findings. For example, recent experiments on unconscious bias challenge an antidiscrimination framework that presumes that color blindness is the rule while prejudice is the exception. This research has potentially dramatic consequences, for example, in the area of employment discrimination law (Bielby & Coukos 2007 :1582 only from conscious prejudice, but in fact, a substantial body of psychological research shows that much of the time people act automatically and unconsciously when they discriminate. This kind of discrimination can occur even when individuals consciously reject negative stereotypes (Krieger & Fiske 2006 :1004 , 1027 -8, 1032 .
Krieger and Fiske call on judges to adopt "behavioral realism [which] stands for the proposition that judicial models -of what discrimination is, what causes it to occur, how it can be prevented, and how its presence or absence can best be discerned in particular cases -should be periodically revisited and adjusted so as to remain continuous with progress in psychological science" (Krieger & Fiske 2006 :1001 . Though acknowledging that "law ... is not epistemology," the two scholars urge judges to "take reasonable steps, whether through the solicitation of expert testimony, amicus participation, or otherwise, to make sure they have the science right" (Krieger & Fiske 2006 :1002 .
Krieger and Fiske's approach would make evidence of divergent patterns in the treatment of whites and nonwhites far more probative of illicit intent. If bias is not a rare and conscious act of animus but a commonplace and unconscious cognitive habit, then systematic differences in the way racial groups are treated could support a prima facie case of disparate treatment. In practice, this approach would revive a significant role for statistics in employment discrimination lawsuits. Should the strategy succeed, it could lead to a central role for expert evidence and culminate in substantial awards for plaintiffs alleging unconscious bias (Parloff 2007) . In fact, law professor Gregory Mitchell and business professor Philip E. Tetlock characterize Krieger and Fiske's proposal as "but a small part of an ambitious project to use implicit prejudice research to remake the law" (G. Mitchell & Tetlock 2006 :1027 . They question the propriety of relying on this work to effect fundamental change:
Attributions of prejudice inevitably rest on complex amalgams of factual and value assumptions, and it is a mistake to suppose that, just because a select group of social psychologists and law professors -with a self-declared agenda to transform American lawannounce the discovery of a new form of prejudice, the rest of society is obliged to defer to their judgment. . . . These social psychologists and legal scholars are claiming, in effect, not only scientific expertise on factors that sway human judgment but also the moral authority to determine where society should draw the line between extremely subtle forms of "prejudice" and behaviors that warrant no censure (G. Mitchell & Tetlock 2006 :1032 Mitchell and Tetlock insist that the courts apply of scrutiny to evidence on unconscious bias lest "an saster of minor-epic proportions" ensue (G. Mitche 2006 (G. Mitche :1118 . This polarizing discourse in turn demon counterintuitive empirical findings can be thorough when they challenge conventional wisdom and p paradigms.
Though race poses special difficulties for the partnership between law and social science, Brown also creates unique opportunities insofar as it shows that social justice cannot be captured in any simple, straightforward formula. In recent years, law and economics has overshadowed the Law and Society movement because "microeconomics is based on a model of behavior that can be readily applied to legal issues" (Erlanger et al. 2005:342) . The rational actor is a concept that neatly coexists with doctrinal images of the reasonable person or the arm's-length bargainer. As a result, the insularity and supremacy of law are not threatened. Yet as constitutional theorist Bruce Ackerman points out, Brown poses a daunting challenge to any easy partnership that obscures fundamental value judgments:
Brown forces lawyers to come to terms with an affirmative value before they can claim an understanding of the deepest aspirations of our existing legal system. . . . When Richard Posner, for example, was pressed to explain the evil of slavery, the best he could do was to assure us that, so long as the dollar value of our labor as free persons is higher than our dollar value as slaves, we have nothing to fear from the great god Efficiency! Yet, Judge Posner has done us all a service in explicitly advancing such a trivializing account of the evil of slavery. For his example should shock us into recognizing that, so long as Brown v. Board of Education remains on the books, lawyers cannot accept his notion that judgments about efficiency are somehow less controversial than judgments about distribution (Ackerman 1984: 91-2; italics in original).
The "bloody shirt" of Brown serves as a constant reminder that abstraction cannot shield the courts from profound moral dilemmas. Recently, racial polemics have obscured the role that social science evidence can play in debates over equal protection law. An axiomatic insistence on color blindness has hardened the discourse.
With a focus on legal history and text, formalists have been impervious to data on the ongoing realities of racial stratification. The Critical Race Theory (CRT) movement in turn has adopted an explicitly oppositionalist stance, treating pervasive racism and intractable racial self-interest as foundational assumptions. CRT treats these postulates as givens, in part because of its selfconsciously political project to resist racism (Parks 2008:7067) .
Rather than subject these claims to empirical verification, critical race scholars have made heavy use of narrative, a technique that relies on first-person accounts to reveal the victim's perspective. By deploying these epistemological moves, CRT seeks to destabilize hierarchies of knowledge, making empathy and transformative change possible.
This dialectic on race reduces the relevance of empirical inquiry by invoking absolutes on each side. Recently, Gregory Parks, a scholar of race, law, and social science, has called for "critical race realism," an initiative that would build a bridge between critical race scholars and social science researchers. Despite this plea, Law and Society scholars so far have had only episodic contact with CRT. Parks acknowledges that a rapprochement could be anathema to those who believe that courts use facts as mere pretexts for decisions; that social science can be neither neutral nor objective; that research typically reinforces the status quo; and that narrative is a superior way to disrupt racial hegemony (Parks 2008) . In a no-holds-barred ideological conflict over the role of color blindness and color consciousness, social science evidence may be seen as a hindrance rather than a help, precisely because empirical uncertainty complicates the clean lines of moral outrage.
Today, the desire for axiomatic truths about race threatens Brown's multidisciplinary legacy. Ironically, both formalists and oppositionalist CRT scholars have concluded that constitutional norms about race are too significant to turn on the vagaries of a contingent and contested social science. So, for those like Parks who call for critical race realism, the challenge is to break through the epistemological gridlock that can arise in the shadow of a polarized politics. In fact, Brown's visionary aspirations for law and social science may hang in the balance.
Conclusion
The Law and Society movement was rooted in a paradox, th conviction that value-free research would naturally lead to pro gressive change. That optimistic assumption has since been attacked from the left and the right, and a new paradox ha emerged. A value-laden, highly polarized politics of race has led a loss of faith in social science as a source of knowledge for self correction. As a result, the contemporary dialogue about race framed in absolutes that appear impervious to data. It seem doubtful that normative battles over race can be resolved in an epistemological vacuum, but it seems certain that the struggle for Brown's multidisciplinary legacy can be lost in one. 
